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Relations amongst religion, the individual, and society 
Whilst acknowledging that there are various factors that influence the Maltese 
character, one must also recognize that religion has been and, to a certain extent, still is, 
an important protagonist in the construction of the identity of Maltese society and of 
individuals.  
Indeed, religion features strongly in all periods of Maltese history, not only 
because of the islands’ history but especially due to an emphatic need of the population to 
construct its identity and meaning. For instance, evidence from the post-Arab period, 
around the dawn of the second millennium, seems to suggest that one of the methods 
used by the Byzantine monks to re-Christianise the Muslim population was to exploit the 
islands’ Christian past and to construct a Pauline mythology (Buhagiar 2006). The 
accentuation and reinterpretation of the Christian past, the construction of local and 
indigenous Christian stories and, most importantly, the closeness of the religious 
community to the indigenous community were always vital roles of religion, throughout 
Maltese history, in the construction of identity and understanding of relations amongst 
individuals and those between the Maltese and their rulers.  
However, the nature of the relationship between Christianity and society has been 
put into question. No one quarrels with the idea that in pre-modern society and, to a 
considerable extent, in pre-Second World War society, Western states, societies and 
individuals were greatly influenced by Christian Churches and theology. This non secular 
state of affairs was also the situation the Maltese experienced until very recently. One 
cannot establish a clear demarcation line when this situation was no longer true. Indeed, it 
seems that parts of the population are still influenced by a non secular mentality. 
However, besides the recent changes which did contribute to change people’s mentality, 
there have also been conscious attempts to secularise Maltese society.  
 
Ambivalent Europeans 
The situation of Church hegemony in Malta has been challenged on various 
occasions during the twentieth century, but the change in the religious beliefs, attitudes 
and practice is only recent. While it has become almost a cliché to say that Europe has 
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steadily become more and more secular (Greeley 2003), the same cannot be said to be 
also happening in Malta. In Europe an increasing majority has ceased to participate 
frequently in religious practices or has stopped altogether to pursue their religious beliefs 
publicly or manifestly. In one respect such a trend was to be expected. According to the 
standard theories of secularisation, modernity should inexorably be accompanied by a 
decline of all that is sacred, a decline that is inversely proportional to increased progress, 
to the spreading of education and to processes involving urbanization and 
industrialization. However, sociological data in Europe shows that the number of 
believers is not equivalent to the size of congregations. It is evident that there are fewer 
Europeans who pursue religion publicly, choosing instead to maintain their faith 
privately. 
Secular society typically relegates religion to the individual’s private life. It is 
summed up in the famous maxim of Frederick II of Prussia that “everyone must find his 
own salvation”, or in Thomas Jefferson’s argument that “it does me no injury for my 
neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks 
my leg.” And yet there is also an ideological element of triumph associated with the idea 
of a secular society. It came into being in a way which was perceived by those who 
attended and welcomed its formation and development as a kind of “struggle” which has 
persisted through the generations. 
Historically, of course, the secular state is the result of a collective learning 
process that can be traced back to the European wars of religion in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. After much bloodshed and violence, that experience of religious 
conflict gave birth to the insight that freedom of thought, conscience and freedom of 
religious beief is a basic human right. Freedom of thought embraces both the positive 
freedom to live according to one’s own religious, quasi-religious or non-religious 
worldview and the negative freedom to be protected from disturbance through the undue 
influence of the worldviews of others. Indeed, commitment to such freedom has justly 
become one of the mainstays of liberal democratic social societies. Even if the above, 
rather potted, historical account may be true, what is of great sociological significance is 
that those who considered themselves to be protagonists of secularisation increasingly 
idealized themselves and the process and that idealization became an important element 
of the process. Such slogans as Voltaire’s “Écrasez l'infâme!”, or Kant’s quotation from 
Horace “sapere aude” – chosen by the Prussian philosopher as the maxim of the 
Enlightenment and translated by him as “Have the courage to use your own intellect” – 
became iconic expressions of secular society. Sociologically speaking, the most 
interesting issue is not the fact of progressive decline in religious practice among the 
European population, but the fact that this decline is interpreted in line with the 
secularisation paradigm. Once it is interpreted through the lens of a “secularist” self-
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understanding, such a decline is seen as “normal” and “progressive”. It is perceived as a 
quasi-normative condition for being a “modern” and “enlightened” European. It is 
precisely this “secular” identity shared by academics and by ordinary people in Europe 
that is sociologically so interesting.  
The history of Malta has allowed little room for the development of such 
sentiment among the general population or even among intellectuals. In Malta, the 
general population did not experience the 16th century religious wars, while the 
introduction and propagation of the reformation were severely restricted by the Knights 
and the Inquisition. For a long period the enemy was the Ottoman Empire and the 
Muslim infidels while, during the colonial period, the British were identified as the other 
and the population were exhorted to pray for their conversion. The enemy was rarely 
from within. The identification of the poor and the lower classes with the Church, the 
close associations of the ecclesiastical authorities with the a large section of the political 
class and well-off elite and the continuous confirmation of the synonymous nature 
between the Maltese and Catholic identities have made it possible for there being an 
almost inexistent process of secularisation up until to a few years ago. 
However, not even Europe can be defined as a secular society in a strict sense. 
Recent sociological data show that that Europeans are not indifferent to the religious and 
spiritual dimensions (Berger 1999, Davie 1999, Greeley 2003, Norris and Inglehart 
2004). Similarly such major events as the death of Lady Diana in 1997, the tragedy of 
9/11, the tragedy caused by the Tsunami, the death of Paul John Paul II, and the terrorist 
attacks in London and in Madrid have consistently shown that there are particular 
instances when the religious and spiritual dimensions come again to the fore. 
At present, one could perhaps speak of the unchurching of Europe, and of 
religious individualization, rather than of secularisation. For it seems that, in so-called 
secular societies, people have developed a private religion rather than have abandoned 
religion altogether. Religion has become invisible rather than non-existent. The emphasis 
has been switched to individualization of belief; the compilation of personal creeds that 
give meaning to one’s unique existence, according to one’s experiences, interests and 
aspirations. Hence, in contemporary Europe, religious identity is increasingly a matter of 
personal choice. Of course, this trend certainly disrupts the traditional forms of 
involvement in religious groups at the parish and also hampers the transmission of 
religion through the family environment. Even so, religion continues to exist even as a 
means of individual identification. However, it informs collective identity to a far lesser 
degree and often no longer provides the framework for ethical standards in the common 
life of Europe’s citizens. More than any other peoples, Europeans are moving away from 
a model which depicts a believer as receiving one’s religious identity from the 
community within which one has grown up, and within which one complies with rules 
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and practices that regulate religious observance and protect the transmission of belief, 
towards a pattern which has been described in terms of two biblical images: that of the 
pilgrim (who follows an individual spiritual journey with a number of stages) and that of 
the convert (who chooses the faith to which she belongs) (Hervieu−Léger 2004, as cited 
by Hervieu−Léger 2006). 
These two images appear to be exceedingly appropriate characterizations of the 
trend towards religious individualization prevalent particularly in Europe. Perhaps the 
best description of this state of religious individualization in Europe is the expression, 
coined by the British sociologist Grace Davie: believing without belonging (Davie 2000). 
At the same time, however, large numbers of Europeans even in the most secular 
countries still identify themselves as “Christian,” pointing to an implicit and somewhat 
diffused Christian cultural identity which −− even from a distance – still governs 
collective reflexes in terms of identity. In this sense, Danièle Hervieu-Léger too appears 
to be correct in coming up with the counterpart characterization of the European situation 
as belonging without believing (Hervieu−Léger 2004 as cited by Hervieu−Léger 2006). 
As she points out very well, “secular” and “Christian” cultural identities are intertwined 
in complex and mostly tacit modes among most Europeans. Jean-Paul Sartre put it even 
more strongly when he claimed, in the name of the French people, “We are all Catholic”. 
 
The Changing Role of Religion in Contemporary Society 
In this scenario, it is interesting to note that, even in what has been described as an 
“unchurched” Europe, religious traditions and expressions of faith are returning to the 
public sphere. Private religion is returning strongly and dynamically to public view 
(Berger 1999). Here we can see, in fact, the face of “post-secular society” – to use the 
term coined by the German sociologist Klaus Eder. The Professor of Sociology at the 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, has defined “post-secularism” as the “return of religion 
to the public sphere” (Bosetti and Eder 2006). He noted the rise of religious messages in 
the society of communication, resulting in the greater visibility of religious beliefs in 
public arenas. He expands on this idea in a useful recent interview, claiming that: 
What I want to say is that during the secular era (still predominant in Europe), 
religion did not disappear, but instead took a form that was invisible at a public 
level. No one talks about religion, and religious groups don't dare to enter the 
public sphere because they do not feel legitimate. Secularisation is nothing more 
than a phenomenon that has hushed up religion: seizure of land, interventions, 
censorship in schools. Therefore, religion has left the public sphere and entered 
the private. But this is not to say that it has disappeared. It has simply become 
invisible. In fact, at a certain point in secularisation, religion became confident 
enough to re-emerge in the public sphere, not with one voice offered by the 
institutions, but with as many voices as there are individuals. We can observe 
this in the amount of activity and religious texts on offer (Bosetti and Eder 
2006). 
5 
 
 
This visibility increases with increased media mobilization and the awakening of 
new religious movements. Eder claims that the idea of a secular Europe is entirely up for 
discussion: religious believers are demanding a stronger and more pervasive presence, 
although the religious phenomenon they are presenting is a less organized one, and they 
are often understood as upholding fewer bonds of belonging. 
The term “post-secular” is being used repeatedly and increasingly by the 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas in his more recent works. In his celebrated dialogue with 
then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, which took place in Munich under the title “The Pre-Political Moral Foundations 
of a Free State,” on the 19th January 2004, the German self-described political liberal 
philosopher appropriated and underlined the term “post-secular society” to call for a 
process of reciprocal understanding between religious and non-religious citizens: 
The expression “post-secular” does more than give public recognition to 
religious fellowships in view of the functional contribution they make to the 
reproduction of motivations and attitudes that are societally desirable. The 
public awareness of a post-secular society also reflects a normative insight 
that has consequences for the political dealings of unbelieving citizens with 
believing citizens. In the post-secular society, there is an increasing 
consensus that certain phases of the “modernization of the public 
consciousness” involve the assimilation and the reflexive transformation of 
both religious and secular mentalities. If both sides agree to understand the 
secularisation of society as a complementary learning process, then they will 
also have cognitive reasons to take seriously each others’ contributions to 
controversial subjects in public debate (Habermas and Ratinger 2006, 46-47). 
Habermas concludes that liberal democracies must leave space for religious expression 
and religious forms of life: 
The neutrality of the state authority on questions of world views guarantees 
the same ethical freedom to every citizen. This is incompatible with the 
political universalization of a secularist world view. When secularized 
citizens act in their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in 
principle that religious images of the world have the potential to express 
truth. Nor must they refuse their believing fellow citizens the right to make 
contributions in a religious language to public debates. Indeed, a liberal 
political culture can expect that the secularized citizens play their part in the 
endeavours to translate relevant contributions from the religious language to 
the public as a whole (Habermas and Ratzinger 2006, 51-52). 
 
In short, Habermas is proposing no less than a “revised concept of 
citizenship”(Habermas 2006, 14) that restores freedom of religious thought and reasoning 
to the public square and also enjoins that secular reasoning proceeds with an eye open to 
the duties of respect, listening, and reciprocity expected of all citizens. 
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It is interesting that back in the eighties Habermas was dismissive of religious 
tradition as the best secular tradition. He upheld the disenchantment and disempowering 
of the sacred domain within society as being a clear gain for humanity (Habermas 1987, 
77). On the contrary, he is now arguing for a post-secular, democratic, public sphere in 
which participants in discussion would be receptive to the presumed rational content of 
arguments whether they be religious or non-religious. This attitude of openness is 
required of citizens who espouse post-metaphysical thinking, as well as of religious 
citizens: secularly minded citizens are required to adopt a self-reflexive attitude towards 
the limits of secular reason and strive to be open to the possible cognitive substance of 
religious reasons; religiously minded citizens are required to acknowledge the secular 
nature of the democratic constitutional state and to accept the validity of liberal 
democratic principles such as equality and liberty (Habermas 2006). 
Habermas wants to avoid imposing intolerable psychological burdens on citizens 
and calls for a democratic public sphere in which religious and non-religious 
contributions would be granted an equal hearing in discussions: 
The liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional separation of 
the religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for 
those of its citizens who follow a faith. ... [Citizens should not have to] split 
their identity into a public and private part the moment they participate in 
public discourses. They should therefore be allowed to express and justify 
their convictions in a religious language if they cannot find secular 
‘translations’ for them… 
[However], the truth content of religious contributions can enter into the 
institutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making only if the 
necessary translation already occurs in the … political public sphere itself. 
This requirement of translation is even a cooperative task in which the non-
religious citizens must likewise participate, if their religious fellow citizens 
are not to be encumbered with an asymmetrical burden. Whereas citizens of 
faith may make public contributions in their own religious language only 
subject to the proviso that these get translated, the secular citizens must open 
their minds to the possible truth content of those presentations and even enter 
into dialogues from which religious reasons then might well emerge in the 
transformed guise of generally accessible arguments. (Habermas 2006, 9-10, 
11-12) 
 
This line of thought was echoed by none other than then-Cardinal Ratzinger in his 
debate with Habermas. Indeed, one of the main points made by the German Cardinal – 
now Pope Benedict XVI – was that our Western civilization appears to be divided into the 
sphere of reason and science and that of religion. He warns that both spheres cannot 
pretend to be insulated from each other. On the one hand, the rational and scientific 
Weltanschauung is not only ethically challenged but actually produces many of the 
ethical dangers of contemporary life. It is not an exaggeration to speak of a “hubris of 
reason” and it makes sense therefore, that secular rationalism should listen to guidance 
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from religious values. On the other hand, religion – like rationality – has not yet been 
able to establish a set of principles acceptable on a universal level and indeed has been 
seen to produce “false universalisms, thereby leading to intolerance and acts of terrorism” 
(Habermas and Ratzinger 2006, 64). It too needs to acknowledge its need for the critical 
and cleansing guardianship of reason. In order that religion and reason might be purified 
of their respective pathologies they both call for one another: 
Religion must continually allow itself to be purified and structured by reason 
… there exist pathologies in religion that are extremely dangerous and that 
make it necessary to see the divine light of reason as a “controlling organ”. 
… [R]eason too must be warned to keep within its proper limits, and it must 
learn a willingness to listen to the great religious traditions of mankind. If it 
cuts itself completely adrift and rejects this willingness to learn, this 
relatedness, reason becomes destructive … Accordingly, I would speak of a 
necessary relatedness between reason and faith and between reason and 
religion, which are called to purify and help one another. They need each 
other and they must acknowledge this mutual need. (Habermas and Ratzinger 
2006, 77-78). 
 
Ratzinger is in broad agreement with Habermas about post-secular society, about 
the need for a willingness to listen and learn from each other, and about the requirement 
of self-limitation and humility necessary on all sides. 
 
 
The Maltese Case 
In many ways, the relationships among religion, society and individuals in Malta 
are different from those in most countries in Europe. One cannot argue that Malta is a 
secular society even though a sizable part of the population relates and operates through a 
secular mentality, and the majority of the population experiences reality in both secular 
and non secular terms. 
In 1999, the European Values Survey revealed that 74.7% claimed to be religious 
persons while, the mean on a ten point Likert-scale item on the importance of God in 
one’s life was 9.15 (EVS/WVS 2006). The Social Values, Science and Technology 
survey demonstrated that, when compared to their European counterparts, Maltese have 
the highest belief in God (95%), the lowest non-believing group (2%), and lowest group 
of believers in a life force or spirit (3%) (European Commission 2007b). The 2005 Mass 
attendance census showed that on a given day in November, 52.6% of the Maltese 
population attended Sunday Mass (DISCERN 2006), which figure indicates a steady 
decline in mass-attendance over the past thirty years. Even so, mass-attendance remains 
high by European standards.  
An overview of the historical, political and sociological data suggests that the 
main motor that brought about change in the attitudes and relationships, was the 
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economy.  People adjusted their lifestyles to respond to the new context leading to a 
situation where  
 
the lifestyles of successful business people, in a free market economy… become 
status symbols which other people seek to appropriate in order to enhance their 
rank in society (Tonna 1995, 67) 
Such changes inevitably lead to a consumerist mentality. People were not only 
consuming basic needs but also other needs suggested by the new culture. Tonna points 
out that “people were actually buying and selling symbols” (Tonna 1995, 73). 
This liberalisation process brought a variety of adjustments to lifestyles, amongst 
which an adjustment to an individualistic mentality leading to a “Here and Now” 
mentality. With the market’s continued expansion, more new values were adopted by 
Maltese. The improved economy brought with it the idea that one should not only satisfy 
the group’s or the family’s basic needs but that it could also meet and immediately satisfy 
the desires of the individual. The ideal of the economy became that of serving the 
personally useful now, thus introducing more individualistic traits (Tonna 1997). These 
new traits were reflected in all sectors of life. 
Tonna (1997) concluded that the changes in the life of the individual meant 
changes in the life of the family and community life in Malta. Studies in the mid-nineties 
showed the family as being very important in the lives of Maltese who, when compared 
with other European countries, claimed the highest level of satisfaction with their home-
life (Abela 1994). Abela (1994) concluded that although, in Malta, there is not as yet an 
alleged situation of individualistic mentality in the family, 
 
the western European trend towards greater individualisation of family values, 
manifest in lower birth rates and higher divorce rates, is making its way gradually 
amongst certain professionals... People are more tolerant of individualized and 
liberal life-styles in society at large, though they often tend to emphasize more 
conventional life-styles for themselves. (38) 
 
A year later Tabone (1995) reported that 30% of the Maltese families experience 
problems which “might be disturbing family solidarity and stability” (124). However, up 
till then only 1.8% were divorced or separated and that only a small minority showed a 
consistent rejection of family values. New concepts and models of family were entering 
the Maltese culture. Tonna (1997) noted that the Maltese family was changing its 
identity. According to him, people were afraid “that they could stretch their capacity for 
family life to a breaking point” (76). This has brought about a growing concern for the 
security and capability of self-preservation of families. According to Tonna, the post-
modern thrust is helping people to search for new ways of experiencing family life. This 
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resulted in an increasing tendency to consider family members as individuals rather than 
as a group. 
Whilst society was introducing and developing an individualistic ethic, the 
Church was concerned with its institutional relationship with society and with 
consolidating its structures. The number of agreements concerning Catholic Schools, 
marriage legislation, and the teaching of Religion in Schools between the Republic of 
Malta and the Holy See might have given the impression that the Catholic Church’s place 
in society was protected. It is plausible to assume that an institutionally oriented 
discourse might have contributed to widening of the gap between society and the Church. 
Similarly, in these past years, the Church rarely contributed to the definition of a national 
identity which was high on the agenda on various occasions, this notwithstanding the fact 
that the Church did have the language and the resources not only to contribute to the 
discussion but to propose new modes of constructing Maltese identity. 
 
At the Crossroads 
The ambivalence shown by recent data seems to suggest that Maltese society is at 
a turning point. For instance, while there has been a significant decline in birth rate of 
19.1% over an 8 year period, (NSO 2004) the number of births outside marriage (which 
are mainly teenage pregnancies) increased from 4.6% to 20.1% in just a decade (NSO 
2007). These figures are in total contrast with the rate of change registered in other 
European countries, (Eurostat 2007). This certainly implies a change in the composition 
of the family and values. While the Maltese seem to be consistent in the importance they 
give to the family, with family, work, and religion ranking most important in the 1991 
and 1999 and 2006 (EVS/WVS 2006, European Commission 2007a), there are evident 
signs of change. Whilst the statistics deduced from the latest Census show that the 
number of separations is just 4.8%, when one analyses this data one finds that the highest 
percentage of marriage breakdowns is in the 30-39 age bracket with 7.2% (NSO 2007b). 
Similarly, from an economic point of view, while the Maltese have increased their 
disposable income, they have also started to borrow more money. Over a nine-year 
period, loans increased by 241.9%. It is interesting that the fastest growing rate in 
borrowing was related to consumer loans and not to home loans with an increase of 
393.5% in the former and 205.9% in the latter (NSO 2004).  
Data at hand seems to point to the existence of a communitarian-individualistic 
divide with no clear borders. Indeed many Maltese seem to experience a fragmented 
lifestyle. In an analysis of the results emerging from recent Eurobarometer and European 
Values Survey, Abela concluded that there seem to be competing Maltese identities. On 
the one hand, an inherited national identity which is related to people’s attachment to the 
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Church and religion and, on the other, a growing identity which is driven by 
individualised and secular values (Abela 2006). 
Undoubtedly, religion in Malta remains very much in the public sphere. Religious 
believers certainly manifest a strong and pervasive presence in Maltese society, although 
they appear to uphold fewer bonds of believing Church teaching and engaging in 
religious practices than hitherto. Notwithstanding this increasingly post-secular face, it 
appears that religion remains central in the construction of the Maltese identity even if the 
religious phenomenon is less homogeneous. It is in this increasingly post-secular society 
that the Church is called to live and proclaim its message. And it is precisely in this 
scenario that the Church – like the rest of society – must manifest a willingness to listen 
and learn from others, and show self-limitation and humility. In addition, in this ever 
more post-secular milieu the Church is called upon to make its message – particularly its 
social message – clear in secular (or rational terms). Pope Benedict XVI expressed these 
features extremely well in his first encyclical: 
Faith by its specific nature is an encounter with the living God…But it is also a 
purifying force for reason itself. From God’s standpoint, faith liberates reason 
from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith 
enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more 
clearly. This is where Catholic social doctrine has its place: it has no intention of 
giving the Church power over the State. Even less is it an attempt to impose on 
those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes of conduct proper to 
faith. Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to 
the acknowledgment and attainment of what is  just. The Church’s social 
teaching argue on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on the basis of 
what is in accord with the nature of every human being. It recognizes that it is not 
the Church’s responsibility to make this  teaching prevail in political life.… 
Building a just social and civil order, wherein each person receives what is his or 
her due, is an essential task which every generation must take up anew. As a 
political task, this cannot be the Church’s immediate responsibility. Yet, since it 
is also a most important human responsibility, the Church is duty-bound to offer, 
through the purification of reason and through ethical formation, her own specific 
contribution towards understanding the requirements of justice and achieving 
them politically. (Deus Caritas Est 28) 
 
A Way Forward 
In a contemporary society where there is evidence of both secular and post-
secular trends, one can hypothesize that the direction in which Maltese society will move 
– whether towards a secular or towards a post-secular scenario – is also up to the local 
Catholic Church. If it is perceived as insisting excessively on securing its institutional 
position in society and using its conventional language in society, this could hasten the 
secularisation process in Malta. The way forward appears to be a definition of the 
Church’s own identity and its relationship with society and, at the same time, an exercise, 
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of a humble, yet clear, transmission of values and ideas that are readily understandable in 
secular terms even if they are different from secular ideas and values. 
The use of reference to the past, the creation of local mythologies and legends and 
the identification of the religious community with the population are three general 
categorisations that definitely played a major role in the relations between Church, 
individuals and society during the non secular age (see Appendix). Thus, in the late 
medieval period, the Church used the past and constructed myths, such as the legendary 
miraculous intervention of St. Paul who appeared riding a horse brandishing a sword 
against the Moors that attacked Mdina in 1429, and throughout the17th century till very 
recently, the Church used the etymology of place-names and the popular veneration of 
Byzantine saints as a proof of uninterrupted and loyal presence of a Maltese Christian 
community on the islands. 
The present situation is indeed a complex one, but this does not preclude the 
Church from using the past, delving deeper in local myths/legends, highlighting new 
stories and outlining the deep relationship between the Christian community and the 
Maltese community. What is needed is a development of a contextualized theology that 
highlights the work of the Word of God in history and everyday life, including politics, 
economy, language and values. An emphasis on divine intervention in history, a 
rediscovery of Maltese Christian every-day life heroes, such as Alfons Maria Galea, and 
an outlining of the contribution of the Catholic Community to the identity, politics and 
economy of the society seems vital. In clarifying its own preferred ecclesial model and in 
strengthening its own identity the Church not only makes an important ad intra exercise 
but is contributing to national identity and social imaginary, that is “the ways people 
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others . . . and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2004, 23). 
Concurrently, the Church needs to identify those issues that are at the heart of 
Maltese society. Rather than responding to current issues, the Church needs to contribute, 
through reflection and dialogue, to matters that are the root causes of the symptoms we 
observe around us. As Paul VI (1967) claimed, the distinct contribution of the community 
of believers lies in its expertise in human realities due to its long experience in human 
affairs. 
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Appendix 
 
Examples from history  
of the relationship between the Church and Maltese society 
 
Historical 
Period 
Use of the Past Creation of local 
Mythology/legends 
Vicinity to the 
population 
Medieval 
Period 
i. Use of Catacombs  i. The introduction of 
the legend about 
Paul’s stay in Malta; 
ii. the miraculous 
interventions by St. 
Agatha and St. Paul 
to save the Civitas 
(Mdina) from Muslim 
incursions  
i. leaving the main 
Civitas and moving 
near the sparse rural 
populations; 
ii. establishment of 
parishes 
Period of 
the 
Knights  
i. Emphasis on the 
Pauline traditions 
with the construction 
and embellishment of 
Churches on places 
connected with St. 
Paul’s stay in Malta; 
ii. use of Byzantine 
medieval rock-hewn 
chapels for the 
propagation of cults 
i. Development and 
propagation of the 
Pauline myth; 
ii. the various myths 
related to the 1565 
Great Siege of Malta; 
iii. reconstruction of the 
Norman liberation of 
Christians in 
medieval times. 
 
i. Establishment of an 
identity at local 
village level through 
parish and patron 
saints; 
ii. contribution to the 
development of 
social and political 
life the parish 
(through, for 
instance, festas and 
confraternities) 
French 
Rule 
 i. The lachrymating 
effigy of St. Paul at 
Rabat. 
 
i. The leadership role of 
the clergy in the 
revolts against the 
French; 
ii. the mediating role of 
Bishop Labini 
British 
rule 
i. Emphasis on St. 
Paul’s conversion of 
the islands; 
ii. emphasis on the 
heroic Christian 
character of the 
Maltese, especially 
during the 1565 Great 
Siege 
i. Emphasis and 
reconstruction of the 
Norman conquest of 
the islands and 
liberation of 
Christians; 
ii. the advancement of 
the hypothesis of the 
continuous existence 
of the Church in 
Malta  
i. The mediating role of 
the ecclesiastical 
authorities with the 
British rulers; 
ii. the establishment of 
philanthropic 
institutions by 
religious or trusted to 
religious 
(Agius 1991, Buhagiar 2006, 2007, Cassar 2004, Farrugia 
Randon and Farrugia Randon 2000) 
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